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Testing
sh
just test # unit + integration tests, fails below 100% coverage
just e2e # real payments on regtest: dashboard, built client, every framework's components in Chrome
just check # rustfmt, clippy (warnings are errors), tsc, svelte-check
just packages # pack, install into fresh React/Solid/Svelte 5/Svelte 4 apps, build, publint, attw, JSR dry run| Suite | Tests | Coverage (enforced) |
|---|---|---|
Rust service (cargo llvm-cov) | 143 | 100% lines, 100% functions |
@deadhop/client (vitest, v8) | 72 | 100% statements, branches, functions, lines |
@deadhop/react (vitest, v8) | 12, plus 1 server-rendering | 100% statements, branches, functions, lines |
@deadhop/solid (vitest, v8) | 13, plus 1 server-rendering | 100% statements, branches, functions, lines |
@deadhop/svelte: Svelte 5 and Svelte 4 syntax (vitest, v8) | 27, plus 2 server-rendering | 100% statements, branches, functions, lines |
@deadhop/svelte/svelte4 on the real Svelte 4 runtime | 15 | n/a |
Dashboard (vitest, v8) | 98 | 100% statements, branches, functions, lines |
| End to end (regtest) | 21 | n/a |
What the numbers mean
- The Rust figure is line and function coverage. Region coverage is about 98.9%; the rest is the error side of
?on calls that are exercised but never fail in tests, such as individual SQLite column reads. - Three conditions that cannot occur in practice are
expects rather than untestable error branches: bech32-encoding a valid key, non-hardened BIP-32 derivation from a valid key (fails with probability about 2⁻¹²⁷), and the operating system's random source. - Unit tests are hermetic: an in-process relay and a scripted Electrum server. The end-to-end suite uses real bitcoind, Fulcrum, a real relay and Chrome.
- Proof of work in the browser is tested both ways: notemine mining in Web Workers when the page's Content-Security-Policy allows them, and the built-in miner taking over under the strict policy. Whatever miner is used, the client checks its result before signing.
- Proxy support is tested against in-process SOCKS5 (with and without a password), HTTP CONNECT and HTTPS proxies in front of a real relay. The relay-change revert is tested with a relay and a proxy that do not exist.
- The high-severity findings from the security review each have a test that reproduces the attack:
survives_a_stray_first_message,one_unreadable_invoice_does_not_stall_the_othersandoperator_requests_cannot_be_replayed_or_borrowed.